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POINT ONE: 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT RAISED NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
Plaintiff agrees that it is not appropriate to raise issues for the first time 
on appeal; however, Plaintiff has always disputed City Market's assertion that its lease 
did not give said defendant any right to use or possess any portion of the common 
areas which include the parking lots and fire lane surrounding the City Market store in 
Price, Utah. Contrary to City Market's assertion that Plaintiff never challenged the 
contents of the Defendant's lease agreement prior to this appeal, Plaintiff responds 
that it has challenged the unsupported statements concerning the contents of the 
leases since they were first raised by City Market in the case at bar. 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that, upon information and belief, City Market is a 
tenant of defendant Utah State Retirement Office and as such has a proprietary 
interest of some sort in the parking lot and fire lane area surrounding its business (See 
Addenda D to Brief of Appellant, Plaintiffs Complaint, f^'s 2, 3 & 12 ). Additionally, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to City Market's Motion for Summary 
1 
Judgment provides in Plaintiffs Statement of Facts at paragraph 1 that City Market "is 
the lessee of both the building and the parking lot area." 
City Market's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed with the court during 
ongoing discovery and was unsupported by any affidavits establishing the terms of its 
lease or by production of its lease agreements. Plaintiff challenged City Market's 
assertion about the contents of its lease by raising the fact that City Market had 
represented itself to Price City as being a tenant of the owner/landlord of this 
commercial subdivision and claimed the right to use designated parking stalls and the 
fire lane surrounding its store. Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of Molly Penovich of 
the Price City Planning and Zoning Department which affidavit was attached as 
Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Memorandum. The whole purpose of that affidavit was to 
dispute City Market's unsupported claim that it had no proprietary or possessory 
interests in the parking lot or common areas surrounding its store. The Penovich 
affidavit included the express site plan provided by City Market to Price City wherein 
City Market designated itself as the tenant of the building "and the surrounding 
parking area." ( See, Statement of Facts, f^ 2, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition 
to City Market's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
The affidavit created a disputed fact, namely, should the court accept the 
unsupported assertion made by City Market about the contents of its lease or should 
the court look to City Market's 20+ year history of claiming to be a tenant with rights 
2 
and maintain its business license. 
City Market now contends that the terms of its lease were not challenged by 
Plaintiff during oral argument and are raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiff 
repeatedly *• ; inng oral argun : .e • i it t! lat 1:1 1 is case w as stil 1 i i i tl ic discov eiy 
process (Transcript of Oral Argument, lines 4-6 p. 17) and that City Market had held 
itself out as the tenant with a right to possess a n d / o r use the parking lot and fire lane 
areas around its store to Price City for over twenty years. (See, discussion between 
Plan itiff s cc ;i u lsel ai id tl le c :>i n I: c o i iceri in lg the site plan at t icl led to tl ic I ei 10 \ icl i 
affidavit located in the Transcript of Oral Argument at p. 21 , line 11 through p. 23, 
line 21). 
After the court looked at the site plan attached to the Penovich affidavit, the 
( .-1yi . oreseeabil.it fy ai id Plaii itiff responded by 
arguing that even if, we accepted that Defendant City Market .1 lad no i esponsibilit y 
under the terms of the written lease, Defendant City Market would still have a duty to 
the plaintiff as its business invitee. (See, Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 12, line 22 
througl : j : • 1! 3 Hi le 10) 1 }h tit it iff :li :11 ic t coi icede t I lat 1:1 ic • t ::i i i is of t 1 ic lease were as 
represented by City Market but rather, in arguendo, that if the lease furnol < ml l<» 1 
as represented, then City Market still had a separate and distinct duty to the Plaintiff. 
(Transcript of Oral Argument, p.321, lines 5-8). 
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Plaintiff has always maintained that City Market is a tenant and has a right of 
possession and/or use in the subject common areas as evidenced by the application 
and site plan it has continuously produced to Price City , but Plaintiff also contends 
that City Market's duty to its business invitees goes far beyond its leasehold interests 
and arises from the concept of "Duty" that has been developed by the courts of the 
State of Utah over the past fifty years and as was outlined by Plaintiff during oral 
argument with reference to Carlile v. Wal-Mart, 61 P.3d 287, 2002 UT App 412 
(Utah App. 12/12/2002) and other supporting authority. Plaintiff respectfully 
contends that the terms of the lease, if any, are disputed issues of fact and should have 
been submitted to a jury after the completion of discovery and the final amendment 
of the pleadings as urged by Plaintiff through the entire oral argument. 
POINT TWO 
A BUSINESS OWNER OWES HIS BUSINESS INVITEES A DUTY 
WHETHER T H E BUSINESS OWNER HAS AN OWNERSHIP/ 
POSSESSORY INTEREST IN THE PREMISES WHERE T H E INJURY 
OCCURRED OR NOT, IF THE OWNER KNOWS, OR SHOULD KNOW, 
THAT INJURY IS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE. 
In Point One of the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff outlined the current status of 
premises liability law in Utah. Plaintiffs theories of recovery are embraced within the 
case law that has developed under the first prong of the test outlined in Carlile, 
namely, that the business owner knew or should have known of the hazardous 
condition and failed to warn or protect his business invitee even though injury was 
4 
reason « foreseeable. Market ilow responses that it can not find a case where 
the business owner has been held liable for inji PI nt 
the business owner's actual business site. That position does not respond to the 
analysis outlined in Carlile or the arguments and theories of recovery contained in the 
Brief c Appellai istead of evaluating the development of the duty/risk analysis 
contained in CariiJe and tl ie cases cited tl :iei eii 1 ( -ity Mai "ket si.1 nplj takes til :itc • j » : s it IN :>i i 
that Carlile would have come down differently if the injury had occurred off Wal-
mart's premises. Such is not the express language in Cadile and the cases cited therein, 
including Dwiggins v. Morgan jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, (Utah 1991) and Pagen v. 
Thrift City, 23 Utah °<1 ?(I7, Aui) 1V\I SIC (19* v :•*- ^ , , ; u u extensively ii i 
Brief of Appellant, provide that business owners have a duty to business invitees to 
discover and warn them of the possible hazards created by third parties if it is 
reasonably foreseeable that injury will result from the hazard. Carlile expressly holds 
that "bi jsii less owi lers have a di it \ tc p • re > • si it accidei ita 1, negligei intentional -
harmful acts of third persons, if they know or should have known, that injury could 
occur." 
Nothing in any of the cases cited by either side expressly requires that the 
injury be '">ii llir biMtiejs «»\uin\ premises The ililli inn i tu the jiulysis nl these 
cases by the parties demonstrates the difference in the social theory ;\< \\ ^ \XThili 
City Market would retreat into its "own four walls" and allow its customers to be 
injured by hazards on its own door step, the modern view of duty is that a business 
5 
own has some affirmative duty to his customers when he invites them to do business 
at his store. It is the knowledge, either real or constructive, and foreseeability of the 
injury known to the business owner that imposes the duty to take action to warn his 
business invitees of the danger. That is even more true when the business owner has 
a hazard immediately adjacent to his main entrance and then continues to invite the 
customer to cross the hazard to conduct business. In that scenario, it is even arguable 
that the business owner created the risk of injury because the hazard itself was not the 
cause of the accident. The cause of the injury was the invitation to conduct business 
when it was reasonably foreseeable that those who accepted the offer would be 
subjected to risk of injury. 
City Market does not deny that the hole that caused Plaintiffs injuries was 
within a few feet of its only store entrance and within the natural flow of traffic from 
its designated parking area to its entrance. City Market does not deny that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that persons could be injured. In fact, the risk was significant 
enough that its own store manager, Sonny, told the Plaintiff that others had been 
injured and he actually placed a warning sign in the hole after Plaintiffs injury.% 
City Market continues to argue that it does not have a possessory interest in the 
property. Plaintiff continues to argue, as has been argued from the very beginning, 
that what City Market says to the world and what it is saying to the Court in this case 
are not consistent. Since City Market did not produce its leases or any affidavits 
establishing the contents of same, Plaintiff responded by showing that City Market 
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1 ; id he Id it self : " 1 • 1 c be • a tt t i; u n w id I ;; pc -cific possessory rights of use by its business 
invitees in the parking lot and fire lane area pursuant to the sil e pis u I pi epared by ( }il y 
Market itself. Tha t site plan was left in continuous possession with Price City to 
suppor t City Market 's business license for twenty years. City Market contends that the 
affidavit of the Planning and Zon ing employee does no t state that City Market has an 
ownership interest in the commoi i areas. This is correct It a lso does i lot sa\ tl lat 
City Market does n o t have a possessory or use interest in the c o m m o n areas. It does 
demonstrate the City Market has enough dominion and control over the c o m m o n 
areas arc i re to guarantee the min imum requirements for parking and safety. 
Plaintiff contends that si ici i dominioi I ai id control is si lfficiei it for a ji n \ t : • ft i id tl iat 
City Market had at least enough control to take action to protect its business invitees. 
Conflicting statements like the representations made by City Market in the site plan, 
which was prepared by City Market itself, gives rise to a disputed fact: Is City Market 
is in actual possession o- the area where Plainlil I" - > i"« m | u n \ P 
While City Market argues that it is no t a "possessor o f land", such a definition 
is extremely self-serving when you do no t tender the leases by which you claim 
insuLili- 'ii (t« »»n responsibihlv hi hit t, Plaintiff argued in Brief of Appellant that such 
an approach would encourage In nil'»nl« ,uul <» n ii»t« '»• u n»",it tivin ill* «< h h, \ ,1 
responsibilities to their business invitees. The principles expressed in Carlile si pv> n i 
sound public policy, namely, that if you are a business and you invite persons to do 
7 
business at your establishment and you know or should have known of a hazard, then 
you should be held responsible, if you did not attempt to prevent i t 
By contrast, City Market defines only a "public invitee" and argues that a 
plaintiff is only given protection as an invitee while she is on the land of the business 
owner. Such a position ignores all the facts that create the duty on City Market Our 
Plaintiff had responded to the invitation and conducted business with City Market 
She was exiting the business at night when she fell into a hole in the asphalt at the 
immediate sole entrance/exit to that business establishment Plaintiff, a business 
invitee, had no alternative to get from the store to the only parking area within a 
reasonable walking distance except to cross the area where the hole is located. The 
duty to such a business invitee is not limited by the boundaries of the businessman's 
property but rather "by the duty that arises when the business owner knows or should 
know" that injury is likely to occur. Carlile, % 12. 
City Market then argues that unless liability is limited to the property 
boundaries of a business owner, presumably as defined by deed or lease, all business 
owners will be subject to liability for injuries that may happen at great distances from 
the actual store location. That position ignores the requirements that the business 
owner must know, or be deemed to have known, that the hazard exists and that it 
could injure people. 
The case at bar creates two opposing positions: Plaintiffs position is that a 
business owner who invites people to do business is responsible for the reasonably 
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foreseeable hazards direc I:H associated \\ itl i acceptii ighis invitation.,, if 1 le knew or 
should have known, that those hazards existed and were likely to c < < »y 
Market takes the position that it is responsible only for what goes on within the four 
walls of its leased premises. Even a surface comparison of those two positions and 
the affect each woui iie safety of the consumer/business invitee speaks for 
itself Carlile and its predecessors stand for the proposition th;n \\ v linvr :i sonni 
conscious and do not allow businesses to benefit from creating or ignoring risks to 
their customers. 
Finally, Plaintiff contends that City Market had actually knowledge, in addition 
to constructive knowledge, of the hazard ,mtl did nothing to w .nil llir Pl.iiiihl'l 
Plaintiff pointed to numerous disputed facts and many reasonable inferences which 
could allow a jury to find in Plaintiffs favor on those issues had Plaintiff been allowed 
to proceed. Summary Judgment was not appropriate given the numerous disputed 
issues of fact in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Plaintiff has not raised new issues on Appeal and since the trial court 
misconstrued current Utah premises liability law and came to conclusions 
incotisi'iicni wild i lie Carlile case. Plaintiff prays that this Court reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment and i ei 1  lai id 1 1 lis • :ase back tc 1 1 i< * t ri a I •• : : n in it: f c r 
the completion of discovery and the scheduling of trial expeditiously as possible, as 
9 
this is an interlocutory appeal and the other Defendant who has not been involved in 
this matter has been delayed during the pendency of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of January, 2005. 
Joane Pappas White 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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this is an interlocutory appeal and the other Defendant who has not been involved in 
this matter has been delayed during the pendency of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of January, 2005. 
Joane4*appas White 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant, by depositing the same, sealed, with first class 
postage prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Price, Utah on this 24th day of 
January, 2005, addressed to the following: 
Scott Christensen 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C. 
Attorney for the Appellee 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey C. Miner, No. 7258 
MORGAN, MINNOCK & RICE, L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant Badow Nielsen Associates, Inc. 
136 South Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
JoaneflPappas White 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Apellant 
11 
